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Abstract 
 
Over the last three decades a risk-based model of medical regulation has emerged in 
the United Kingdom. To promote a risk-averse operational culture of transparency 
and professional accountability the regulatory state has intervened in medical 
governance and introduced best-evidenced practice frameworks, audit and 
performance appraisal, Against this background the paper analyses descriptive 
statistical data pertaining to the General Medical Council’s management of the 
process by which fitness to practice complaints against doctors are dealt with from 
initial receipt through to subsequent investigative and adjudication stages. Statistical 
trends are outlined regarding complaint data in relation to a doctor’s gender and race 
and ethnicity. The data shows that there has been an increase in rehabilitative and/or 
punitive action against doctors. In light of its findings the paper considers what the 
long-term consequences may be, for both patients and doctors, of the increasing use 
of risk-averse administrative systems to reform medical regulation and ensure 
professional accountability. 
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The Hearing of Fitness to Practice Cases by the General Medical Council: 
Current Trends and Future Research Agendas 
Introduction 
 
 This paper is concerned with the management of complaints against doctors 
and the hearing of fitness to practice cases by the General Medical Council (GMC). 
The GMC is the governing body responsible for overseeing the regulation of doctors 
in the United Kingdom (UK). The 2008 Health and Social Care Act introduced 
significant and far reaching reforms to medical regulation in the UK, the full affects 
of which will not be known for at least another generation (Chamberlain 2010a). The 
GMC was reformed, the performance surveillance and management tool revalidation 
introduced to ensure the continuing and rigorous on going appraisal of medical 
practitioners fitness to practice, while perhaps most importantly, the level of proof 
required for evidential purposes in the hearing of medical malpractice cases by the 
GMC was reduced from a criminal to civil standard (Chamberlain 2010b). These 
changes have been conceptualised in some quarters as suggesting there has been a 
shift toward the adoption of a risk-based approach to medical governance (Lloyd-
Bostock and Hutter 2008). It has also been noted that the medical profession has 
collectively sought to respond to this changing regulatory landscape by internally 
reforming its self-regulatory institutions to modernise the training and regulation of 
doctors (Davies 2004). Bound up with which has been the rhetorical advocacy by 
medical elites of the need to shift toward a ‘stakeholder model’ of professional 
regulation that is professionally-led but requires the proactive involvement of the 
general public and other health and social care professions (i.e. see Irvine 2003). 
Similar to the introduction of clinical governance in the National Health Service 
(NHS) professional-led medical regulation seeks to promote a ‘risk-averse’ working 
culture of transparency and accountability through the proactive use of clear 
performance standards and best-evidenced protocols and guidelines to inform 
decision-making processes (Irvine 2003, Chamberlain 2009a). 
As a result of this mixture of externally and internally generated reform 
medicine’s training programmes, disciplinary mechanisms and regulatory inspection 
regimes now possess clear standards that can be operationalised into performance 
outcomes against which the fitness to practice of members of the profession can be 
regularly checked in an apparently open, transparent and accountable manner (Irvine 
2006). When taken alongside the rise of health care managerialism and the patient 
rights movement in the UK over the last three decades - which together have arguably 
led to the increasing third-party questioning of the medical decision making process - 
contemporary developments in medical governance and health care organisation and 
delivery seem to indicate that medical dominance and autonomy in the UK has been 
successfully challenged and is now in decline (Ahmad and Harrison 2000, 
Chamberlain 2009b).  Others have argued that it is more appropriate to hold that the 
medical profession is being transformed into a more restratified open and accountable 
‘elite’ and ‘rank and file’ form (Chamberlain 2010a). The latter increasingly being 
subject to surveillance and performance management by the former as medical elites 
respond to a more intrusive regulatory state. According to this viewpoint the 
regulatory state is increasingly seeking to proactively control institutionalized forms 
of specialist expertise (of which professions such as medicine are but one example) 
for a mixture of economic cost and risk-management reasons (Friedson 2001). 
Against this shifting regulatory background the paper discusses descriptive 
statistical trends in the relatively under researched area of the hearing of fitness to 
practice cases by the GMC. Complaints are certainly not the only measure by which 
to analyse changes in the relationship between medicine and the general public. 
Additionally the analysis of complaint data is complicated slightly by the emergence 
of defensive medical practice as a seemingly legitimate but nevertheless ultimately 
self-defeating coping strategy.  Defensive medicine occurs when diagnostic or 
therapeutic measures are used by a doctor as protection against possible accusations 
of negligence or underperformance, rather than because their patient really needs 
them (Summerton 1995). Studies show doctors are increasingly engaging in defensive 
medicine as a result of a rise in health care managerialism, an increase in patient 
complaints and greater emphasis being placed on patient choice (Nettleton 2006). 
This reinforces the need to approach raw complaint data with caution. For a complaint 
can arise because of tension between a patient’s sense of personal entitlement and 
strategic health-care planning and rationing as much as because of the action of an 
attending medical practitioner.  Although the GMC possesses a statutory duty to 
investigate every complaint it receives it is not always appropriate or reasonable for a 
complaint to lead to action being taken against a doctor (Stacey 1992, 2000). This 
must be born this in mind when using such data to analyse broader changes in the 
relationship between the medical profession and the general public. Nevertheless this 
paper argues that focusing longitudinally on the management of the complaints 
process and fitness to practice case hearings is in itself an invaluable tool from which 
to assess the impact of the current regulatory reform agenda on the day to day 
operation of the GMC. Dame Janet Smith (2005: 1174), at the end her governmental 
review of the GMC as part of her analysis of the Shipman case, was ‘driven to the 
conclusion that, for the majority of GMC members, the old culture of protecting the 
interests of doctors lingers on’. The analysis of the handling of patient complaint by 
the GMC arguably allows some albeit restricted access to the medical club from 
which to tentatively identify if and how far, any cultural change has occurred since 
Smith’s report. Any analysis of cultural change within the operation of the GMC 
could also be expected to look at complaint data in relation to the ethnicity of medical 
practitioners. For the little research available on this topic seems to indicate that 
overseas qualified doctors are more at risk of having action taken against them by the 
GMC (see Stacey 1992, Allen 2000). Similarly it would be useful to explore 
complaint data in relation to gender given the medical workforce may well become 
predominately female over the next decade if current recruitment trends continue 
(Winyard 2009). It was consequently decided to include consideration of gender and 
ethnicity in the analysis of GMC complaint data. 
The paper is divided into three sections. The first section outlines the 
procedure followed by the GMC when it receives a complaint about a medical 
practitioner. This sets the necessary background for section two, which discusses 
complaint data and figures relating to the hearing of fitness to practice cases by the 
GMC. The final section discusses the findings presented and in doing so it argues for 
the need to undertaken further analysis of data held by the GMC concerning its 
activity.  The paper concludes by arguing that the findings presented provide an 
invaluable baseline from which such an analysis could be undertaken against the 
background of the emergence of an increasingly economic cost-focused and risk-
averse regulatory state. 
 
The GMC and the hearing of fitness to practice cases 
 
Currently they are 231,415 doctors on the GMC register (GMC 2010). The 
GMC is responsible for removing doctors from this register by dealing firmly and 
fairly with medical practitioners whose fitness to practise has been questioned 
(Chamberlain 2010a). The GMC does not deal with complaints against NHS systems 
(although it may deal with complaints against individuals that illustrate system 
failings). Nor does it arrange for complainants to receive an apology, an explanation 
of what happened, or provide help and support for compensation claims (1). The 
GMC only deals with complaints that call into question a doctor's fitness to practise 
(GMC 2004a). Under Section 35C(2) of the Medical Act (1983), alongside the 
guidance to good practice provided in its document Good Medical Practice (2009), 
the GMC focuses upon complaints that highlight instances where a doctor has made 
serious or repeated mistakes in carrying out medical procedures or in diagnosis (i.e. 
by prescribing drugs in a dangerous way), has not examined a patient properly or 
responded appropriately to their medical need, has committed fraud, dishonesty or 
serious breaches of a patient confidentiality, and finally, has received a criminal 
conviction or has developed a physical and/or mental health issue (Chamberlain 
2010a).  
Since 2004 the GMC’s fitness to practice procedures have been divided into 
two separate stages: investigation and adjudication. Previous to this cases were dealt 
with by three separate committees (Health, Conduct and Performance). During the 
investigative stage what is known as the initial ‘triage’ process involves making an 
initial decision as to whether or not to proceed with the case (GMC 2004a). Some 
cases are clearly outside of the GMC’s remit. For example, a complaint may not be 
concerned with an individual medical practitioner. If necessary the GMC will refer 
the matter to the doctors’ employer so local procedures can be used if necessary to 
respond to it. If the initial information points toward a criminal conviction then the 
matter will be immediately referred to a fitness to practice panel for adjudication 
(GMC 2004a). 
If the triage process confirms that the complaint requires further consideration 
the GMC will proceed to the full investigative stage. Here the GMC will disclose the 
complaint to the doctor in question and their employer to ensure a complete picture of 
the doctor’s practice can be obtained. All cases are overseen by two case examiners, 
one of whom is a non-medical practitioner and one a medical practitioner. Witness 
statements and supportive material will be collected and analysed, including copies of 
patient medical records or other formal documentary material (i.e. employer reports). 
Where there is a concern with performance or health, appropriate tests will be 
completed at this stage (Etheridge et al 2009). The investigation period concludes 
with either no further action been taken, a warning being issued, a practitioner 
agreeing to what are referred to as ‘undertakings’, or a case being referred to a fitness 
to practice panel for adjudication (GMC 2010) (2).  
The adjudication stage involves a formal hearing of a case by a fitness to 
practice panel. The panel is made up of medical and non-medical lay members. If 
needed, the panel will be advised by a specialist health or performance advisor. They 
are five main outcomes of a fitness to practice panel meeting: no further action, giving 
a doctor a formal warning, putting restrictions of a doctor’s professional practice (i.e. 
imposing supervision or requiring they undertake further training), suspending a 
doctor from the medical register so they may not practice for a given period of time, 
and finally, erasing a doctor from the medical register. It is the intention of the GMC 
when they erase a doctor from the medical register that this normally will be for life. 
A doctor has twenty-eight days to appeal against a decision which they lodge at the 
High Court.  
Since 2005 all GMC fitness to practice decisions have been reviewed by the 
Council for Healthcare Regulatory Excellence. Under section 29 of the National 
Health Service Reform and Health Care Professions Act (2002) the Council can refer 
a decision to a High Court for review if it considers a GMC decision to be unduly 
lenient. The Council for Healthcare Regulatory Excellence forwarded 4 such cases in 
2005, 6 in 2006, 0 in 2007, 1 in 2008, 1 in 2009 and 0 in 2010 (Council for Healthcare 
Regulatory Excellence 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010a). This reduction in 
referrals could be held to reflect an increasingly rigorous stance on behalf of the GMC 
towards fitness to practice cases (Allsop 2006).  
There is a growing perception within the medical profession that the GMC is 
far less tolerant of infractions than it was previously (Dyer 2010a, 2010b, 2010c). 
Many practitioners are concerned with what they perceive to be the increasing 
politicisation of the operation of the GMC (Chamberlain 2010a). For example, during 
each stage of the complaint process a case must pass what is called ‘the realistic 
prospect test’. Meaning that allegations will only proceed if there is a realistic 
prospect of establishing that a medical practitioner’s fitness to practice can be called 
into question to such a degree that justifies the GMC taking action on their 
registration status (GMC 2004a). Under the Health and Social Care Act (2008) the 
level of evidence required to secure a guilty verdict has been reduced from a criminal 
(absolute) to civil (on the balance of probabilities) standard. This change was justified 
by the regulatory state on the grounds that the GMC has often in the past been unable 
to remove a doctor from the medical register, even when doubt existed over their 
clinical performance, because the level of evidence required to do so was too high 
(see Irvine 2003 and Allsop 2006). After the Shipman case many members of the 
profession agreed changes were needed to update the organisation and working 
culture of the GMC so underperforming doctors could be more easily stopped from 
continuing to practice. But it has also been argued that moves to reduce the level of 
evidence needed to remove a doctor from the medical register have become bound up 
with of a wider politically motivated and unrealistic tendency, on behalf of the 
regulatory state, to seek to minimise clinical risk and cost by turning medical work 
into a series of routine step-by-step rules and procedures against which individual 
clinician performance can be measured and judged (Chamberlain 2010b). Indentifying 
if there had been a substantial rise in the number of doctors removed from the medical 
register as a result of changes in the level of evidence needed to pass the realistic 
prospect test, formed an important part of the analysis of GMC data outlined in the 
following section of this paper. 
 
Trends in complaints and the hearing of fitness to practice cases 
 
Having outlined the process by which a fitness to practice complaint proceeds, 
this section of the paper focuses upon data pertaining to the hearing of fitness to 
practice cases by the GMC. The rest of this section of this paper details the main 
features of the data obtained directly from the GMC for between 2006 and 2009, with 
data from earlier years being discussed where possible (3). It is important to begin by 
recognising that although the figures discussed do descriptively illustrate the 
operation of the GMC they should not be taken as a representation of its total activity 
for each calendar year. Not least of all because the nature of the process is such that a 
complaint received in 2009 may not reach resolution until 2010. This said, having 
year on year comparative data does allow for descriptive statistical trends to emerge, 
as the paper will now turn to discuss. Table 1 shows the total number of complaints 
received by the GMC for between 1999 and 2009. It also shows the number of 
complaints received by the GMC in 1995 and in 1998. The figures for 1995 and 1998 
were obtained from available published GMC documents (GMC 2003a, 2004b). 
Aside from 2006 when the number of complaints for some reason reduced sharply, 
taken together the figures show that the number of complaints received by the GMC 
has roughly trebled over the last 15 years, from 1503 in 1995 to 4722 in 2009. 4722 
complaints represent 2% of all medical practitioners currently on the GMC register 
(n= 231,415). The dip in complaints in 2006 cannot be attributed to any major change 
in the organization or role of the GMC during this year, so it may well simply be a 
statistical aberration, as does happen sometimes when dealing with longitudinal data. 
 
Table 1: Number of complaints received by the GMC (1999 – 2009) 
Year Number of Complaints 
2009 4722 
2008 4166 
2007 4118 
2006 2788 
2005 4128 
2004 4005 
2003 3962 
2002 3937 
2001 4504 
2000 4470 
1999 3001 
1998 3066* 
1995 1503* 
 * source (GMC 2003a, 
2004b) 
 
It appears that complaints doubled between the mid and late 1990s, with the 
number trebling into the beginning of the new millennium, before evening off slightly 
(aside from in 2006) until increasing back up again in 2009. It is too early to tell yet if 
the slight jump in the number of complaints in the last year will persist. The available 
figures do seem to reinforce the validity of the view that in the last two decades there 
has been an increase in the questioning of medical authority and autonomy, with the 
result that individuals are more likely to complain about their doctor and/or the 
treatment they have received (Nettleton 2006).  Bound up with this may well be the 
fact that high profile medical malpractice cases, such as the respective Bristol 
Infirmary and Shipman cases for example, have significantly raised the profile of the 
GMC in the eyes of the news media and general public, with the result that the 
number of complaints it receives has increased (Chamberlain 2010b). 
 Next it is necessary to identify the source of complaints. This analysis was 
complicated by the fact that the GMC reporting of complaints received by each main 
category - i.e. members of the public, a fellow doctor, a person acting in a public 
capacity – is different in the data source documents for between 2000 and 2005 (GMC 
2000, 2001, 2004, 2005) than for the 2006 to 2009 years (GMC 2010). But it was 
possible to combine the categories into a simple public/other dichotomy to help paint 
a broader picture of patterns in the source of complaints received by the GMC. This 
data, displayed in Table 2, shows that the majority of complaints received come from 
the general public, but there has been a gradual increase in complaints from other 
sources in recent times. This may well reflect the fact that the GMC has recently taken 
a more proactive stance toward working with local NHS employers and private 
healthcare providers as it seeks to promote a working culture which encourages 
complainants to come forward with their concerns without fearing negative 
consequences for their career, particularly as this has been recognised as a key issue 
in the past (Department of Health 2009).  
 Table 2: Source of Complaint 
Source of Complaint 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
General Public 73% 75% 76% 77% 74% 73% 66% 70% 68% 64% 
Other 27% 25% 24% 23% 26% 27% 34% 30% 32% 36% 
 
The next step is to break down the initial complaints made against doctors 
against their ethnicity and gender. It was not possible to obtain data pertaining to 
complaints received in relation to ethnicity prior to 2006 from the documents made 
available by the GMC.  It has been noted that the GMC did not routinely collect data 
pertaining to ethnicity prior to the introduction of a new electronic recording system 
in 2005, as well as that subsequently to this in the 2007 to 2008 reporting period it 
‘undertook a major exercise to improve the quality and coverage of its ethnicity data’ 
(Humphrey et al 2009:19). In part this has been because of growing concerns over 
possible discrimination and racism, as doctors who qualified overseas and 
subsequently came to practice in the UK seem to be at higher risk of being referred to 
the GMC as well as having high impact fitness to practice decisions made against 
them i.e. having limitations placed upon their practice or being struck off the medical 
register (Allen 2000, West et al 2006). Humphrey et al (2009) in their review of 
available data for between 2006 and 2008 found that UK doctors from ethnic 
minorities were not at greater risk of being subject to high impact decisions or being 
struck off the medical register, however overseas doctors were. It should be noted that 
Humphrey et al (2009) were cautious concerning their findings due to the limited data 
available to them. The data made available for this paper by the GMC concerning the 
percentage breakdown of initial complaints by ethnicity, as displayed in Table 3, 
shows relative consistency in the complaints by category over the last four years. It 
seems to be the case that Asian or Asian British ethnic minorities are overrepresented 
in terms of complaints made against them. It is not know how many of those 
individuals classified as Asian or another ethnic minority by the GMC data-set, come 
from overseas. 2001 census data shows that 7.9% of the United Kingdom population 
belong to an ethnic minority and that the Asian or Asian British category accounts for 
4% of the population as well as 50% of all ethnic minorities (Office of National 
Statistics 2001). The available data reinforces the need for a doctor’s ethnicity to be as 
far as possible recorded when a complaint is received as currently ‘unspecified’ 
remains a major response category. This may be expected somewhat given that it is 
not always possible for a complainant to know a doctors ethnicity. But it would 
nevertheless be expected that the ‘unspecified’ category would decline if the GMC 
were to adopt a more proactive (and possibly more retrospective) stance on the 
recording of ethnicity data in relation to initial complaints received. Although perhaps 
an unavoidable factor at play here may well be, as will be discussed in more detail 
shortly, that the majority of complaints do not make it past the initial triage stage as 
this obviously complicates the retrospective collection of ethnicity data in relation to 
initial complaints received. 
 
Table 3: Breakdown of complaints received by Ethnicity  
Ethnicity 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Asian or Asian 
British 
18% 17% 18% 19% 
Black or Black 
British 
3% 3% 3% 4% 
Mixed 1% 1% 2% 1% 
Not Stated 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Other Ethnic 
Groups 
3% 3% 3% 3% 
Unspecified 29% 29% 26% 27% 
White 46% 47% 48% 45% 
 
The breakdown of complaints by a medical practitioner’s gender can be found 
in Table 4. It was possible to extract from GMC documents available online data 
pertaining to complaints against male and female doctors for 2002 onwards. However 
it was not possible to obtain data for the 2005 year. Similar to ethnicity, reliable data 
has only become available relatively recently due to the recent review and 
computerization of GMC records. The available data suggests that complaints are 
more likely to be made about male doctors than female doctors, although it does 
appear to be the case that complaints against female doctors rose slightly over the last 
four years. The greater emphasis on male doctors may well reflect the fact that the 
medical workforce has traditionally been male dominated and that the GMC caseload 
mix includes breaches of fitness to practice which are perhaps more commonly 
associated with male rather than female risk-taking behaviour i.e. improper sexual 
relationships with patients, criminal activity and substance/alcohol abuse (Stacey 
1992, 2000). The proportion of female doctors in the profession has risen significantly 
in the last decade, with projections suggesting that by 2017 the majority of doctors 
will be female, which may help explain the slight proportionate rise in complaints 
against female doctors (Winyard 2009). The data in Table 4 could be used as a 
baseline from which to comparatively analyse changes (if any) in complaints received 
by the GMC in relation to gender as the makeup of the medical workforce changes.  
Table 4: Breakdown of complaints received by Gender 
Gender 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Male 83% 82% 81% Unknown 79% 81% 78% 77% 
Female 17% 18% 19% Unknown 21% 19% 22% 23% 
 
 Having looked at the number of complaints made, it is now necessary to look 
at the figures relating to the progression of cases from the investigation and 
adjudication stages. It was impossible to identify with certainty comparative figures 
prior to 2006. The reports available online via the GMC website which contain 
complaint data for between 2000 and 2005 suffer from the complication that the 
process by which the GMC handles complaints changed during this period as part of 
reforms introduced in light of the Shipman case (Chamberlain 2010b). Until 2004 the 
GMC’s fitness to practice procedures were governed by separate legislation involving 
different committees concerned with three aspects of a doctors fitness to practice: 
Health, Conduct and Performance. The available figures for the operation of each 
committee make it difficult to identify with certainly data pertaining to case 
outcomes, not least of all because there was some natural overlap with the handling of 
cases by each committee. It should also be noted that some reports (for example for 
the 2004 year) only break down the data for part of the year (in the case of the 2004 
report for between January and October 2004) making it impossible to compare data 
year on year. Nevertheless the available data for between 2006 and 2009 does reveal 
some interesting trends concerning the GMC handling of complaints.  
Table 5 displays what happened after each complaint was received by the 
GMC. In pure numerical terms the data shows that more warnings and rehabilitative 
undertakings occurred in 2008 and 2009 than in previous years, as well as that more 
cases are being referred for adjudication than previously. For year on year 
comparative analysis purposes the data has also been broken down into the relative 
percentages for each action category based on the total number of complaints received 
during a year. This reveals some important consistencies in the GMC handling of 
complaints received and subsequent actions undertaken, in spite differences in the 
number of complaints received each year. Table 5 shows that the majority of 
complaints are closed with no further action either at the initial triage stage (between 
68% and 71% of complaints received over the 4 year period) or after the initial 
investigation has been completed (between 85% and 90% of all complaints received 
over the four year period). When disciplinary action is taken at this stage the doctor in 
question either agreed to rehabilitative undertakings (between 1% and 2% over the 
four year period) or has been issued with a written warning (between 3% and 5% over 
the four year period). Importantly then, although more complaints were referred for 
adjudication via a fitness to practice panel in 2009 than 2006, proportionally speaking 
only a relatively small percentage of complaints made it past the investigative stage 
(minimum 10% in 2007 and maximum 15% in 2008 over the four year period 
between 2006 and 2009). Finally, as already noted, in 2009 the GMC received 
complaints concerning 2% of all doctors on the medical register (n= 231,425) and 
Table 5 shows that 0.14% of all doctors on the medical register were referred to a 
fitness to practice panel for adjudication during that year (n= 319). 
 
Table 5: Breakdown of GMC response to complaints received  
 2006  2007  2008  2009  
 Number % Number % Number  % Number % 
Complaints 
Received 
2788 100% 4118 100% 4166 100% 4722 100% 
Concluded at Triage 1970 71% 2953 71% 2872 69% 3226 68% 
Concluded at 
Investigation 
472 17% 
 
769 19% 
 
658 16% 870 18% 
Concluded (Both)   - (88%)   - (90%)   - (85%)   - (86%)
Warning Issued 86 3% 159 4% 168 4% 212 5% 
Undertakings 
Agreed 
44 1% 40 1% 109 2% 95 2% 
Referred for 
Adjudication 
216 8% 196 5% 359 9% 319 7% 
 
Having identified how complaints are handled by the GMC at the initial 
investigative stage, it is now necessary to detail the outcomes of cases heard at the 
adjudication stage by a fitness to practice panel. Table 6 details the outcomes of 
fitness to practice panel hearings for between 2006 and 2009. For year on year 
comparative purposes the data has been broken down into relative percentages for 
each action category based on the total number of cases heard per year (the total 
number of cases referred is also included for information purposes). This reveals less 
year on year consistency in the types of action taken at the adjudication stage than at 
the investigative stage. But it also reinforces that at the adjudication stage the hearing 
of complaints is more likely to result in high impact decisions, such as conditions 
being placed on a doctors practice (between 15% and 21% over the four year period), 
suspension from the medical register (between 29% and 37% over the four year 
period), or erasure from the medical register (between 17% and 25% over the four 
year period). Relatively few doctors receive undertakings or warnings at adjudication 
stage: it seems that the most common outcome of the adjudication stage is either a 
high impact decision or the decision that there was no impairment in a doctors’ 
practice. There also appears in the last four years to have been an increase in the 
relative proportion of doctor’s being erased from the medical register as well as a 
decline in the decision that there was no impairment in a doctor’s practice. 
Nevertheless, it does not seem that the shift to a civil standard of evidential proof has 
resulted in an immediate and significant increase in doctor’s being erased from the 
medical register, as was feared it would by some quarters of the profession 
(Chamberlain 2010a). Finally, taken together Tables 5 and 6 show that 0.14% of 
doctors on the medical register (n=231,425) were referred to a fitness to practice panel 
for adjudication in 2009 (n= 319) and 0.03% (n= 68) were erased from the medical 
register. 
 
 
 
Table 6: Breakdown of GMC fitness to practice committee activity 
 2006  2007  2008  2009  
Cases referred for 
Adjudication 
216 n/a 196 n/a 359 n/a 319 n/a 
Cases heard 221 100% 257 100% 204 100% 270 100%
Impairment – no action 8 4% 13 5% 4 2% 4 1% 
No Impairment – no action 47 21% 36 14% 28 14% 44 16% 
Voluntary Erasure 3 1% 2 1% 0 0% 3 1% 
Undertakings 4 2% 4 2% 3 1% 3 1% 
Reprimand 1 1% 1 1% 0 0% 1 1% 
Warning 14 6% 8 3% 22 11% 22 8% 
Conditions 38 17% 55 21% 30 15% 48 18% 
Suspension 69 31% 78 30% 75 37% 77 29% 
Erasure 37 17% 60 23% 42 20% 68 25% 
 
Discussion  
 
The data outlined highlights several key trends in the complaints received by 
the GMC and the types of action which subsequently occur. In summary, the number 
of complaints has tripled since the mid-1990s, although it should be noted that the 
number of complaints remains low i.e. in 2009 the GMC received 4722 complaints 
which represents 2% of all doctors on the medical register (n= 231,425) and 0.03% 
were erased from the medical register in that year (n= 68). The GMC receives more 
complaints from members of the public than from other sources (although this seems 
to be rising) as well as more complaints about male doctors than female doctors. This 
may well be a reflection of the fact that the GMC caseload mix includes breaches of 
fitness to practice more commonly associated with male than female risk-taking 
behaviour i.e. improper sexual relationships with patients, criminal activity and 
substance/alcohol abuse (Stacey 1992, 2000). Although the majority of complaints are 
made against white doctors, it seems that Asian or Asian British doctors are over 
represented in terms of initial complaints received. But this finding must be treated 
with extreme caution, as the breakdown of ethnicity data for initial complaints is 
incomplete, while published research shows that doctors from an ethnic minority are 
not more likely to be subject to a high impact decision, but it seems doctors who 
qualified overseas are (Allen 2000, Humphreys et al 2008). This said, it clearly it is 
important that this issue be explored further at both a NHS and GMC complaint level.  
Although the numbers remain relatively small in terms of total complaints 
made there can be no doubt that the data discussed reveals that more doctors are being 
subject to rehabilitative and disciplinary action by the GMC than previously. 
Importantly, however, it also illustrates that the shift toward a civil standard of proof 
does not seem to have had an immediate large-scale impact on GMC fitness or 
practice activity i.e. significantly more doctors have not been struck off the medical 
register. But it does seem that more cases have been referred to the adjudication panel 
in the last two years than previously. Yet it is perhaps too early to tell if the shift in 
the level of evidence required to meet the realistic prospective test will result in more 
complaints passing from the investigative to adjudication stage and more doctors 
being either struck off the medical register or subject to some form of disciplinary or 
rehabilitative action. The data presented in this paper is, consequently, an important 
starting point from which future trends in GMC activity can be tracked by interested 
parties as the impact of recent changes in medical governance in the UK take hold.  
In addition to their long-term research value, the data has more immediate 
consequences for the contemporary study of medical regulation. Firstly, it arguably 
provides empirical evidence for the view that the operational culture of the GMC is 
indeed changing. In the past the GMC has been accused of being self-serving, biased 
in favour of doctors, failing to protect patients, being overly-secretive, as well as 
acting through expediency rather than principle (Chamberlain 2010a). Dame Janet 
Smith in her review as part of her analysis of the Shipman case was particularly 
critical of the GMC and how it handles complaints (Smith 2005). Yet the growing 
emphasis being placed on taking rehabilitative or punitive action against doctors 
could be interpreted as providing evidence that an organizational and cultural shift 
toward a more risk-averse regulatory model as the GMC acts to regain public trust in 
its decision making processes (Allsop 2006). Whether this state of affairs best serves 
the long-term interests of the regulatory state, the public, or the medical profession 
itself, is a subject for ongoing analysis and debate.  
 Secondly, and taking this point further, an important consequence of this shift 
toward risk-averse forms of medical governance perhaps comes most clearly to the 
foreground when the GMC’s administratively robust approach toward the handling of 
complaints is considered.  Risk-based regulation relies heavily on seemingly objective 
decision-making processes where codified forms of knowledge are used to prescribe 
best-evidenced judgemental norms surrounding what constitutes appropriate action in 
a given situation (Llyod-Bostock and Hutter 2008). The relatively consistent 
administrative approach adopted by the GMC toward the handling of complaints in 
terms of the disposal pathway by which cases typically progress, as illustrated in 
Tables 5 and 6, could be said to be demonstrative of a growing organizational reliance 
on codified risk-averse procedural rules to assist in the day-to-day processing of 
complaints. There is a very real danger here that this may over time undermine the 
value placed on the tacit dimensions of professional expertise within the broader 
professional community as rank and file practitioners in particular become ever more 
wary of the GMC and its associated bureaucratic machinery.  The concept of 
defensive medical practice, which was discussed earlier in this paper, provides an 
illustrative example of how the reliance on codified and routinized frameworks to 
guide action within health case systems can alter the behaviour of the wider 
professional community in unforeseen ways as practitioners seek to adjust to 
changing circumstance and avoid the possibility of punitive action being taken against 
them. There is a real danger that the growth of risk-averse medical regulation may 
bring with it unintended negative consequences for patient care. Consequently 
targeted research into the impact of GMC reform on practitioner behaviour in 
everyday clinical decision-making situations is needed if we are to more fully 
examine the impact of the current regulatory reform agenda on professional practice.  
This brings us to our third and final point. This is concerned with recent 
developments regarding the role of the GMC in the hearing of complaints.  The 2008 
Health and Social Care Act established the Office of Health Professions Adjudicator 
(OHPA) to take over the role of the GMC in the adjudication of fitness to practice 
cases. The stated aim of this change was to enhance impartiality and the independence 
of the fitness to practice hearing process within the Health Care Professions 
(Department of Health 2009). OHPA became a legal entity in January 2010. But in 
the summer of 2010 the UK government concluded that it was not persuaded of the 
need to introduce another regulatory body to take over the role of adjudicator in 
fitness to practice cases (Department of Health 2010). In part this decision was made 
in light of the stringent economic realities faced by public services in the UK as the 
state seeks to deal with the fall out of the recent global financial crisis. But it is also a 
reflection of the extent to which medical elites have successfully managed to subject 
rank and file practitioners to greater peer surveillance and control under the ever 
watchful gaze of the regulatory state and its managerial imperatives (Chamberlain 
2009b). Yet it is arguable that the fact that a significant number of complaints do not 
make it past the initial triage and investigative stages raises legitimate questions about 
the GMC’s gatekeeper role at each point in the decision making and follow up 
process. The issue here is not a lack of action being taken against a doctor. Rather it is 
the lack of rigorous, ongoing and publicly accountable third-party surveillance and 
appraisal of the reasons for a lack of action. Not least of all because the little 
independent research into the GMC handling of complaints which exists has in the 
past revealed the presence of judgemental bias (i.e. Allen 2000, Smith 2005). A recent 
small scale independent review of a sample of GMC complaints found that 
“articulate individuals who present their complaints clearly and in detail are more 
likely to have their cases taken up by the GMC” (Hughes et al 2007:15). Similarly, 
although generally supportive of the GMC, the Council for Health Care Regulatory 
Excellence has stated in light of their recent audit of GMC operations that “we 
consider that it [The GMC] needs to ensure that its decision makers have fully 
understood all the complainant’s concerns, and that complainants feel that they are 
encouraged to submit a complaint” (Council for Health Care Regulatory Excellence 
2010b:28). Bearing this in mind it is arguable that the data presented in this paper 
reinforces the need for further independent research into the GMC case management 
and hearing process to ensure recent reforms do not serve to underplay the legitimacy 
and value of the patient experience and perspective in all its multi-dimensional forms 
(Mulcahy 2003, Nettleton 2006). Such a research agenda should be undertaken in 
tandem with research into the practitioner experience of GMC reform to ensure a 
rounded picture is obtained of the impact of the shift toward risk-averse models of 
medical regulation. 
 
Conclusion                             
 
 The evidence discussed in this paper lends weight to the argument that the 
emergence of risk-averse medical regulation has led to the GMC taking a harder 
stance toward patient complaints. The governmental focus of the regulatory state for 
now has moved to ensuring that GMC reform continues to enforce a shift toward a 
rigorous and fair complaint and fitness to practice adjudication process. Possible 
options currently voiced for consultation include a greater focus on the use of 
rehabilitative measures within the complaints system when concerns about a doctor’s 
clinical performance exist, alongside the development of a more streamlined ‘in 
house’ tribunal system, headed by an independent president, who would be 
responsible for overseeing fitness to practice cases separately from the complaint 
receipt and management process, the handling of which would be retained at a day to 
day level by the GMC (Department of Health 2010). Yet only time will tell what the 
next steps in the reform of the regulation of doctors in the UK will be. But one thing 
is certain. The balance of power and control has not shifted away from doctors and 
towards patients. Rather it is shifting toward specialist groups, some of whom operate 
inside the medical profession and some of whom operate outside of it, who although 
they may disagree on many things nevertheless share in common the belief that risk-
averse systems of surveillance and control are the best way forward in ensuring 
rigour, transparency and accountability in medical regulation. 
 
Footnotes 
 
(1) The GMC is one of a number of bodies which deal with complaints against 
medical practitioners. NHS Hospital Trusts, Primary Care Trusts; alongside the 
National Clinical Assessment Service, the Healthcare Commission and the 
Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman, are all important points of contact for 
dealing with medical malpractice and patient complaints. But the GMC remains the 
only body able to remove a doctor from the medical register and therefore stop them 
from practising medicine in the UK (Stacey 2000).  
 
(2) Undertakings are an enforceable agreement between the GMC and a doctor. Their 
duration can last for a maximum period of three years. They might include restrictions 
on a doctor’s future practice or behaviour, as well as the requirement that they commit 
to having medical supervision or re-training. All undertakings are regularly reviewed 
by the GMC, operating in liaison with a doctor’s employer as well as postgraduate 
and specialist medical training providers (i.e. the royal colleges). In comparison, a 
warning occurs when there is a significant concern about a doctors’ practice, but 
imposing restrictions on their practice is not held to be necessary.  
 
(3) Contact was made with the GMC requesting under the Freedom of Information 
Act (2000) the release of data pertaining to complaints it received against doctors 
between 1990 and 2009. 2010 was excluded as yearly figures would not at the time of 
request be available. These dates were selected as they cover a period of time when 
the principle of professional self-regulation came under increased scrutiny and the 
GMC underwent significant internal reform. The request asked that the GMC to 
breakdown by gender and race how cases proceeded through the complaints process 
as it was felt these variables may yield interesting findings in relation to identifying 
possible trends in the data. The GMC provided the requested information on the 
hearing of fitness to practice cases for between 2006 and 2009. It was stated that the 
GMC have only held fully computerised record systems since 2006 and that the 
resources which would need to be allocated to review the paper files to obtain the data 
requested would exceed the appropriate limit of costs incurred. This has been set at 
£450 for public authorities under the Freedom of Information (Fees and Appropriate 
Limit) Regulations (2004). The GMC noted it was possible to obtain some more 
limited data on the hearing of fitness to practice cases for the years 1999 to 2005 from 
documents published via the GMC website (see GMC, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003b, 
2004c, 2010). 
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